This paper presents parts of the SECREDS project which aims to bridge the gap between system modeling and implementation using a high-level programming language. Within SECREDS secure applications are developed top down starting with a top-level speci cation. Top-level speci cations are given by our computational model and application-speci c security policies are speci ed using our security requirement logic. To implement a top-level speci cation we developed a high-level programming language called INSEL + o ering language concepts well adapted to our underlying model. We will present main features of INSEL + focusing on access control aspects and we will outline some guidelines to support the systematic implementation of a given top-level speci cation preserving speci ed security properties.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of developing secure applications is still a great challenge. Secure applications should be developed top-down starting with a formal top-level speci cation given by a security model comprising the security policy of the application. A lot of security models have been proposed in the literature focusing on con dentiality (e.g. Bell, 1975) or integrity (e.g. Clark, 1987) aspects. Besides their individual shortcomings existing approaches lack appropriate support to bridge the gap between system modeling and implementation using a high-level programming language. Hence, a framework is required o ering features to model the behavior of a distributed secure application on a high level of abstraction as well as features to specify access properties as well as information ow properties adapted to the speci c needs of the application. In addition, a high-level programming language is required o ering language concepts adapted to the formalism used for top-level speci cations. This adaption enables to systematically transform a top-level speci cation into an executable program.
The paper presents parts of the SECREDS project which aims to bridge the gap between the formal speci cation of secure parallel and distributed applications and their implementation and execution in a distributed environment. The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In section 2 we give a short overview over the SECREDS project. Section 3 brie y introduces our computational model and the logic to specify application-speci c security policies. Section 4 presents main features of the language INSEL + . The development of INSEL + programs starting with a top-level speci cation is explained by means of an example. Section 5 concludes the paper.
SECREDS { AN OVERVIEW
Within SECREDS a framework to design and implement secure distributed applications is elaborated. An overview over the working areas of the project is sketched in gure 1. The paper focuses on the dotted parts. In SECREDS the development of a secure distributed application starts with a top-level speci cation comprising a semantic model of application's behavior together with those attributes needed to capture security properties.
Top-level Speci cation 3 These properties (the security policy) are speci ed by allowed or disallowed information ows between users, as well as, access restrictions for users dened with application-speci c granularity. The security properties are given by means of formulas of our security requirement logic.
A top-level speci cation is implemented by stepwise re nement. First, the speci cation is transformed into a program using the language concepts of our high-level programming language INSEL + . Though desirable we are not able to perform a veri ed transformation from top-level speci cation to implementation within SECREDS. Formal veri cation requires great e orts (e.g. EHDM (Rushby, 1991) ). Within SECREDS we pursue a less sound but more pragmatic approach. Instead of elaborating formal transformation rules we developed a programming language which o ers language concepts that allow to express security properties in a declarative way. As the language concepts and the formalism to specify security policies are very closely related, major parts of the speci cation can be directly implemented using the adapted language concepts. In addition, we have elaborated guidelines which aid the application programmer in transforming a top-level speci cation into an INSEL + program.
INSEL + applications are executed in a distributed environment based on a tailored security architecture. The security architecture is part of the MoDiS distributed operating system (cf Eckert, 1996) . Describing this architecture lies beyond the scope of this paper. The key feature of MoDiS is its distributed manager architecture. All resource management tasks including security services are cooperatively accomplished by a distributed re ective manager architecture. As INSEL + programs are realized by stepwise re nement it is the task of these managers to perform security services like access controls, authentication and encrypting messages sent across a network.
TOP-LEVEL SPECIFICATION

Computational Model
In this subsection we introduce the main features of our computational model to describe system behavior. A more detailed and formal description of the model can be found in (Eckert, 1995) .
A distributed application is modeled by a set of objects and subjects.
Objects are the protected entities which can be speci ed with ne-grained granularity. Objects are only accessible via well-formed operations comparable with well-formed transactions in the Clark-Wilson model (Clark, 1987 
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Restricting information ows based on allowed and forbidden in uences turns out to be very restrictive as many applications just require that the information ows caused by in uences may not be observable by other users. cerning access rights or it may contain an expression concerning other objects of the system, for instance a timer to restrict access for a user to a limited period of time.
Based on the security requirement logic introduced a security policy for a secure parallel application is speci ed by a formula P 2 TFO. Usually, a security policy is speci ed by a conjunction of conditional non-in uencing, conditional non-observing and of access restriction predicates which must hold in every state of a computation, hence by a conjunction of 2acc(:::); 2cninf(:::); 2cnobs(:::) formulas. As a computation of the model is given by a sequence of states associated with action executions the security policy P must hold in every state of the computation.
Example: Bank Scenario
Consider for example a simpli ed bank scenario. The set of protected objects comprises the customer accounts. For each account the set of operations is given by OP(account) fread OP; enter rights OP; delete rights OPg. To distinguish between the operation itself and the access right we introduce the set of rights fread; enter rights; delete rightsg. Users can act in di erent roles. Depending on the role a user currently plays a di erent set of access rights is granted. To keep the example simple we introduce only two roles: customer and clerk. Subjects in this scenario are for instance user representatives for customers and clerks. With each account we associate a unique owner and a clerk responsible for managing the account.
To manage access rights we introduce an object access matrix M. M is a two-dimensional array, where columns are given by bank accounts and rows are given by users and roles and where each entry describes the set of access rights a user or role possesses with respect to a speci c account (usual access matrix approach). Notice, that in our model possession of an access right is The security policy can be strengthened or weakened systematically by adding or removing information ow or access restrictions or by modifying the conditions within the requirement formulas.
IMPLEMENTATION
INSEL + Programming Language
Given a top-level speci cation we have to implement the speci cation using a programming language. Unfortunately, existing languages provide no or only insu cient languages features to support the implementation of security policies. Hence, application programmers have to deal with low-level security 9 mechanisms (cf (Ancilotti, 1983 , McGraw, 1979 ) and security services o ered by the underlying operating system like simple access control lists for les. To bridge the gap between speci cation and its implementation programming language concepts are needed, that allow to specify security properties in a declarative fashion as far as possible and that are well adapted to the formal framework used for security policy speci cation. Our programming language INSEL + o ers the desired features.
INSEL + is a strongly-typed, object-based language for programming secure parallel and distributed applications. INSEL + provides concepts for passive and active objects. An active object de nes a separate thread of control. Each object is an instance of an INSEL + -class. A class de nes a set of operations that provide the only means for accessing objects of that class. One important feature of INSEL + is the principle of nesting. The principle of nesting enables to restrict the scope of objects according to visibility rules known from blockoriented programming languages like Ada 95 (cf Feldman, 1996) . That is, access to objects can be a priori restricted. INSEL + -objects may cooperate and communicate calling operations on other objects.
The object model of INSEL + is closely related to the object model of our formal framework. With the adapted object model, the principle of nesting and the well-known properties of object-based languages (e.g. information hiding by encapsulation) INSEL + provides an appropriate basis for implementing secure applications.
Security-related language features
Until now concepts for implementing access control policies that are speci ed with access restriction formulas acc have been elaborated and incorporated in INSEL + . Language features to support the implementation of information ow restrictions (cninf, cnobs predicates) are still under investigation. As a lot of these ow restrictions can be expressed by access control restrictions as well, just needing appropriate object labeling, we are already able to implement a wide range of information ow policies. For instance, information ow restrictions comparable to the well-known multi-level security policy MLS (Bell, 1975) can easily be transformed into access control restrictions by introducing security classi cations and clearances for objects. Within the Cond condition of an access control formula acc conditions expressing the 'no write down' and 'no read up' property of MLS must be speci ed to restrict access according to the MLS policy.
To support the implementation of acc predicates INSEL + provides the concept of access-controlled objects and classes. For each operation of an access-controlled entity we are able to formulate a boolean expression called access restriction expression that is evaluated at runtime on each operation call before operation execution. If the access restriction expression is true for the calling object the requested access is allowed and the operation is executed, otherwise access is denied. To handle denial of accesses we integrated a simple exception handling mechanism in INSEL + .
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Access Restriction Expression
An access restriction expression de ned for an operation of an access-controlled entity is a boolean expression that may contain: (1) local objects of the access controlled entity including input and output parameters of the operation; (2) global objects, (3) special predicates IN ACL and ACCESSED and (4) the attribute Caller. The attribute Caller is de ned for each operation call and describes the calling object. It contains the uid (Caller.UserUid) of the user who created the object, the identi er of the role this user currently plays (Caller.Role), the identi er of the calling object (Caller.Actor) and the execution context of the calling object given by the identi er (Caller.Con) of the operation. With the components of the Caller attribute the application programmer is able to express access restrictions concerning speci c users, roles, active objects or contexts, in which the active objects acts. Further components, for example containing a security label of the calling object to support the implementation of label based security policies, can be added to the Caller attribute.
IN ACL Predicate
For each access-controlled INSEL + -object an access control list (ACL) is implicitly de ned which may contain a list of subject identi ers for each operation (right) of the object. A subject identi er may be either a user identi er or a role identi er. The list of subject identi ers in an ACL entry for an operation may contain positive and negative subject entries (= negative right). The ACL of an access-controlled object is initialized on object creation. The initialization of the ACL is speci ed in a special part of the class description of the object. To dynamically change the entries of an object's ACL, the operation ChangeACL OP(...) is implicitly de ned on each access-controlled INSEL + -object. With ChangeACL OP(...) the associated ACL of the object may be altered.
ACCESSED Predicate
The predicate ACCESSED allows to check if a subject has already accessed an object via a speci c operation. With the ACCESSED predicate the application programmer is able to specify restrictions depending on the access history of subjects. The INSEL + runtime system provides a range of mechanisms for implementing access-controlled entities in a distributed environment. ACLs are implemented and managed in a secure way using low-level mechanisms o ered by the underlying security architecture. Objects must be authenticated by using appropriate authentication mechanisms. As sketched in section 2, SECREDS aims to provide a security architecture tailored to our language concepts for implementing application-speci c security policies.
Guided Transformation
In this subsection we roughly explain some guidelines to systematically transform a model and its associated security policy into an INSEL + -program. The guided transformation is explained based on the previously introduced bank example.
Given the set of objects de ned in the top-level speci cation we identify classes of objects which have the same functionality and the same security requirements. For example the set of customer accounts in the bank scenario forms such a class. For each identi ed class the application programmer has to implement an INSEL + -class which de nes the set of operations (rights) speci ed for the objects. If users can act in di erent roles, the set of initial roles has to be de ned in a special role part in the main program. Each role requires the implementation of an INSEL + -class specifying user representatives for users acting in this role.
The labels of objects de ned by the generic set of labels in the model have to be implemented. Some application-independent labels, like the user which is associated with an object and the role this user plays, are directly supported by the attribute Caller. Application-speci c labels, for example the label account owner of a customer account in the bank scenario, have to be implemented by local variables of the object and have to be managed explicitly.
To implement the access restrictions speci ed by acc predicates the Cond conditions of these predicates must be transformed into corresponding access restriction expressions. Consider for instance the implementation of the customer accounts. Each account is an instance of the access-controlled INSEL + -class AccountType. The labels account owner and resp clerk de ned for an account are implemented by the input parameters AccountOwner and RespClerk, i.e. these labels are initialized on creation of a new account. The access matrix M is implemented by the ACLs implicitly associated with each account. The operations enter rights OP and delete rights OP de ned in the model are implemented in INSEL + by the prede ned operation ChangeACL OP. As an account's ACL may only be accessed via the ChangeACL OP operation the policy restrictions concerning the access matrix are implicitly implemented. The initialization of the ACL of an account is speci ed in the ACL part of the class AccountType. For each operation of an account an access restriction expression implementing the access restrictions for accounts speci ed by the acc predicates is given in the access restriction part of the class. The following program skeleton speci es the class AccountType. THIS is the keyword for self-reference of an object or an operation. It strikes the eye that the gap between the Cond conditions of the acc predicates and the corresponding access restriction expressions is very small. Look for example at the acc predicate speci ed for the operation read OP. The condition that an entry in the access matrix, (read 2 M l(ur):user; account]), has to exist for the calling user is implemented in the access restriction expression for Read OP by the IN ACL predicate IN ACL(Caller.UserUid,THIS,THIS) and the condition that this user has to act in role customer (l(ur):role = customer) is implemented by Caller.Role = Customer.
The acc predicates for the operations enter rights OP and delete rights OP are combined and transformed into one access restriction expression speci ed for operation ChangeACL OP. As access and information ow restrictions may be speci ed for individual objects we are faced with the problem of specifying contradicting requirements.
We have elaborated criteria to analyze access restriction formulas with respect to speci c consistency properties. This analysis is incorporated into our INSEL + compiler. Discovering an inconsistency the compiler shows the two access restriction expressions and the kind of inconsistency caused by these expressions. Contradicting access restriction expressions then must be xed by the application programmer. Hence, the programmer is o ered support to strengthen or weaken parts of the security policy to gain an overall statically consistent policy as far as possible. approach aims to bridge the gap between formal speci cation and implementation we presented main features of our programming language INSEL + o ering well adapted language support to implement the top-level speci cation of a secure distributed application in a systematic way. Guidelines have been developed to implement access restriction formulas using the INSEL + features. Some of these guidelines have been demonstrated by means of an example. The development and implementation of our tailored security architecture to realize secure applications in a distributed environment is still on going. Future work is concerned with enhancing INSEL + , and our compiler as well as our security architecture with features to implement a wider range of information ow policies, that is to implement information ow formulas which can not be transformed into access restriction formulas.
The SECREDS approach combining formal speci cation techniques and attuned programming language concepts and tools supports the application programmer in developing secure applications of high quality.
